Coastal erosion is a global and pervasive phenomenon that predicates a need for a strategic approach to the future management of coastal values and assets (both built and natural): should we invest in protective structures like seawalls that aim to preserve specific coastal features, or allow natural coastline retreat to preserve sandy beaches and other coastal ecosystems? Determining the most suitable management approach in a specific context requires a better understanding of the full suite of economic values the populations holds for coastal assets, including non-market values. In this study, we characterise New South Wales residents' willingness to pay to maintain sandy beaches (width and length) in the face of coastal erosion along the Australian state's nearly 2200 km coastline. The measurement instrument is a stated preference referendum task administered state-wide to a sample of 2014 respondents, with the payment mechanism defined as a purpose-specific incremental levy of a fixed amount over a set period of years. We use an innovative application of a Latent Class Binary Logit model to deal with "Yea-sayers" and "Nay-sayers", as well as revealing the latent heterogeneity among sample members. We find that 65% of the population would be willing to pay some amount of levy, dependent on the policy setting. In most cases, there is no effect of degree of beach deterioration -characterised as loss of width and/or length of sandy beaches of between 5% and 100% -on respondents' willingness to pay for a management levy. This suggests that respondents who agreed to pay a management levy were motivated to preserve sandy beaches in their current state irrespective of the severity of sand loss likely to occur as a result of coastal erosion. Willingness to pay also varies according to beach type (amongst Iconic, Main, Bay and Surf beaches) -a finding that can assist with spatial prioritisation of coastal management. Not recognizing the presence of nay-sayers in the data or recognizing them but eliminating them from the estimation will result in biased WTP results and, consequently, biased policy propositions by coastal managers.
INTRODUCTION
Beach environments provide various services such as aesthetic beauty, habitat for marine and terrestrial plants and animals, transportation, protection from coastal hazards, opportunities for recreation and income generation (Brenner, Jiménez, Sardá, & Garola, 2010; Camacho-Valdez, RuizLuna, Ghermandi, & Nunes, 2013; Windle & Rolfe, 2013) . This array of services has accelerated industrialization and urbanization processes along the coast and given rise to coastal population centres and coast-dependent economies (Falco, 2017) . Changes in climate have also contributed to changes in coastal communities over decadal and millennial timeframes (Short & Coastal erosion demands an ongoing need for management of both natural coastal assets and the built assets that have accumulated in the coastal zone. Coastal erosion can introduce or increase competition amongst land-uses or asset classes (Phillips & Jones 2006 , Titus et al. 2009 ). As coastlines erode, land may be assigned to build assets like roads, houses or infrastructure, or to natural assets like beaches. Each of these assets types will provide a different level of economic value to the surrounding community, so the economic implications of asset trade-offs need to be considered in management decisions.
Primary management options include a) preserving specific coastal assets (usually built assets) by constructing natural or engineering buffers that limit erosion of specific sites deemed to be of high value (Abel et al. 2011 ), or b) undertaking "planned retreat", whereby any built assets deemed to be at risk of erosion are systematically and sequentially removed from the erosion zone. The planned retreat strategy focusses on maintaining natural assets, including sandy beaches, by removing any hard infrastructure surfaces that might otherwise act as barriers to their natural landward migration; these natural assets subsequently act as natural barriers, protecting remaining built infrastructure from further damage (Doody 2004 , McGranahan et al. 2007 ). These alternate management strategies highlight the difficult trade-offs between natural and built assets that are inherent in managing coastal erosion. In reality, management options can be less clear-cut. For example, seawalls or other engineering structures may be built to protect natural assets (like specific surf breaks that are deemed to be of special significance or which provide a large economic return from tourism); engineering works may be augmented with 'beach nourishment' to try to maintain both built and natural values at a given location.
Coastal protection in Australia has traditionally focussed on the protection of built assets through the use of sea-walls or other engineering structures without considering the economic implications of alternative land allocation strategies (Gurran et al. 2007 ). This has been achieved through the allocation of public funds by local and state governments alone or in partnership with the federal government (Gurran et al. 2007 , McFadden 2010 . In some cases, illegal coastal protection works have been carried out by individuals to protect private assets (usually homes). Whilst these strategies have been successful in protecting built assets at high-risk coastal locations, they can also have adverse implications for other coastal values. Coastal protection works can also come as a more direct (inplace) trade-off with sandy beaches or other coastal ecosystems like mangroves and saltmarsh because the preservation of hard infrastructure makes the landward migration of these ecosystems impossible (Nordstrom 2003 , Feagin et al. 2005 ). Sandy beach loss or narrowing resulting from seawalls or other protective structures has been reported in Australia (Abel et al. 2011 ) and at a large number of locations around the globe (Fletcher et al. 1997 , Phillips & Jones 2006 . The value of sandy beach (and other coastal ecosystems) losses are rarely accounted for when the costs and benefits of coastal protection are being assessed (Phillips & Jones 2006 , Abel et al. 2011 ). Moreover, protective strategies tend to occur in an ad-hoc or reactive manner and focus on mitigating losses for stakeholders who are directly affected by erosion (e.g. directly impacted homeowners) without necessarily accounting for the broader suite of values, like recreation or non-use values, that the population might hold for other assets (Abel et al. 2011 ).
Different coastal erosion management strategies are likely to be relevant at different coastal locations dependent on community preferences for the configuration of the coastal zone, including the appropriate mix of built versus natural assets, into the future. Irrespective of the management option that is ultimately selected in a given setting, securing coastal assets for future use will require a significant investment in long-term planning and management. To ensure effective and efficient future management it will be necessary to a) enhance their financial sustainability to ensure the level of funding allocated to coastal erosion management is sufficient for management costs, b) ensure that management is in line with community values and preferences for future coastal configurations and c) move away from ad-hoc protection and repair works towards a more strategic management approach that prioritises the maintenance and protection of natural and/or built assets at key priority locations. Multiple questions then arise … Are citizens willing to invest in the maintenance of their coast? How does management account for affected parties (like homeowners) as well as other stakeholders, like those who use coastal sites for recreation, or those who place a high value on the protection of coastal ecosystems? Which beach(es) should receive higher funding priority?
Addressing these questions requires a better understanding of the full suite of economic values the population holds for coastal assets. In this context, it is information relating to the non-use values of coastal areas that are currently most lacking. These non-use values encompass existence value -the value associated with knowing that biodiversity and other environmental values continue to exist (Perace & Moran 2013), bequest value -"a willingness to pay to preserve the environment for the benefit of one's descendants" (Turner et al. 1994) or for future generations (Pearce & Moran 2013), and option value -a value people place on potential future use of an environmental site or resource (Stevens et al. 1991) . These are best quantified using non-market stated preference techniques like Contingent Valuation and Choice Modelling (see Methods).
This study seeks to quantify non-use values for a specific coastal asset type -sandy beaches -held by households along the coast of New South Wales in south-eastern Australia. We have designed this study so that it will address a number of the management challenges identified above. First, the payment mechanism employed is a targeted incremental annual levy. This is a common payment mechanism in Australia and provides managers with an estimate of residents' willingness to pay for management that prevents beach loss, as well as a realistic vehicle through which sustainable financing of coastal management might be achieved. Second, we employ a repeated, hypothetical referendum task to compare willingness to pay (WTP) among four beach categories (Surf beaches, Bay beaches, Main beaches and Iconic beaches) and in response to the travel distance between a specific beach location and the respondent's home. These elements of our survey design go to addressing the question of how investment should be prioritised amongst a range of beaches along a given coastline -in this case, amongst the 755 open coast beaches that are exposed to erosion processes along the NSW coast.
From an applied point of view, this study contributes to the current literature by providing significant empirical findings that coastal managers can benefit from in their decision making about how to sustainably and efficiently finance coastal management into the future. From a methodological perspective, this study uses an innovative latent class model to infer both preference heterogeneity and to identify and deal with strategic (or protest) voting in the form of "nay-" as well as "yea-saying" during estimation. We present an alternative approach for dealing with nay-and yea-saying; many studies exclude these groups from overall estimates of WTP, which we argue can lead to a serious under-or over-estimation of value.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, we review some of the relevant literature. We follow with a description of the method and data used for the study. In the penultimate section, we report results of residents' willingness to pay to maintain sandy beaches in the face of coastal erosion pressures. We conclude with a discussion of the policy and research implications of our findings.
BACKGROUND AND CASE STUDY CONTEXT
The study was conducted in the state of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia. NSW has a total coastline length of 2194 km, equivalent to 3.6% of Australia's total coastline (Australia, 2004) . The NSW coast is a dynamic place and since Australia's initial human occupation over 50,000 years ago, people have witnessed major changes in sea level, habitats and shape of the shoreline from great storm events. Over the geological past this dynamism has been even more pronounced, with sea levels up to 4-6 metres higher than today and the shoreline in some places more than 500 kilometres inland 
MATERIALS AND METHODS

THE CHOICE EXPERIMENT
Over two decades ago, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ( The concepts in economic theory underlying referendum surveys are preferences characterized in monetary units (consumer surplus, compensating variation, willingness to pay), the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle as a criterion for aggregating individual preferences into a social choice rule, and Samuelson's theory of optimal supply of public goods, developed in a stream of literature that has emphasized incentive-compatible mechanisms that blunt the 'free-rider' problem (Green, et al., 1998) . To be incentive compatible, a referendum on a pure public good needs to be a "take-it" or "leave-it" offer, where the vote doesn't influence any other offers that may be made to agents and where the payment mechanism is coercive in the sense that each agent can be required to pay independently of how the individual agent voted (Carson & Czajkowski, 2014) . Many economists believe that if subjects are adequately economically motivated, the cognitive paradoxes sometimes observed in psychological experiments disappear (Green et al., 1998) . Thus, a decision rule should be selected that is realistic and binding on respondents. In Australian (and NSW) political settings direct democracy is practised to exercise majority rule. As a consequence, referenda have been used before to determine the provision of public goods (Green et al., 1998; Mitchell & Carson, 2013) . We, therefore, proposed in this research to utilize a RCE approach, focused explicitly on whether NSW residents' willingness to pay for management that prevents beach loss.
EXPERIMENT MATERIALS
Following a literature review and two focus group discussions, six attributes and their appropriate levels were identified to characterise beach erosion control policies: beach type, beach distance from residences and beach length and width deterioration (as a percentage), levy time horizon, and annual levy specific to beach category. The payment was presented as a household levy that would apply to all NSW households. This is a familiar payment vehicle for Australians, and in the introduction to the task participants were reminded of the Emergency Services levy (REF) and were informed that the proposed levy would be applied to property or passed along in the form of increased rental payment (the latter made explicit with the intent of informing renters that they would indirectly be affected). The levy would be imposed for a specific time duration, ranging from 10-50 years. The literature indicates that one-off payments can be excessively conservative, which led to our use of the annual levy (MacDonald, Ardeshiri, Rose, Russell, & Connell, 2015; Whitehead & Blomquist, 2006) . To arrive at a reasonable range of levies to test, we used an estimate of the net present value of housing at risk under planned beach retreat, the total number of affected households and a 3% annual interest rate over 50 years, say, to calculate upper and lower levy amounts for each beach category. Figure 3 provides an overall upper and lower range of levies, sufficiently wide range to allow coverage for a comprehensive set of future analyses, in terms of population affected by the levy. Table 2 presents the full list of attributes and levels considered for the referendum task. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Individual policy preferences were measured using the choice modelling framework presented in Figure 4 . Individuals could select between the status quo (implying explicit beach deterioration and no specific maintenance action to be taken) and a proposed levy to pay for management that prevents beach loss and maintains the current condition (width and length) of the beach. As mentioned earlier, four beach categories (Iconic, Surf, Bay and Main) were studied. Respondents were asked to choose between two options (see Figure 5 ):
Yes: for a given beach of a certain nominated type and specific proximity to their residential location, an annual levy of the amount shown and for the time horizon specified would be used to counter beach erosion of that beach by preserving the (percentage) length and width indicated.
No: this 'status quo' alternative meant that the beach received no specific incremental maintenance action taken by the local council. The consequence of voting for this policy was that the specific beach would suffer a loss of beach length and width over the time horizon ("no specific maintenance action taken" policy scenario on the left in Figure 5 ). Residents of NSW would not pay any extra levy in this case. The attribute level values used in specific choice tasks were defined by an efficient experimental design generated using NGENE software. We generated a design using the D-efficiency criteria (Scarpa & Rose, 2008 
DATA COLLECTION
Data for our analysis came from a state-wide sample of NSW residents. In all, 2014 respondents were drawn from a consumer sample of a major national online panel company. The survey was administered in the period of August 12-22, 2016, through a web-based interface. Respondents were recruited roughly in proportion to the composition of the NSW population in terms of key demographic variables, such as age, gender and income. Figure 6 provides an overview of sample distribution over NSW, with respondents positioned at their postal code centroid. Sample characteristics are given in Table 3 . There is a higher female participation (55.6%) compared to male (44.4%). The average age was 49 years. Participants were from different types of households with the majority (34.6%) being "Couple family with children". Among quintiles of income, the largest proportion of respondents (31.4%) falls in the top quintile. Of the 2,014 respondents, 578 (28.7%) indicated that they have not visited a beach in the past 12 months, nor are willing to visit a beach; in this study, such respondents are classified as not being beach users. The remaining 1,436 (71.3%) are considered beach users. This latter group reported that in aggregate they have made 20,007 visits to a pre-specified set of 39 nominated beaches along the NSW coastline (see Figure 66) , resulting in an average of 14 visits per year. Almost half of the total visits were made to Iconic beaches, whereas Main (22.5%), Surf (16.5%) and Bay (11.5%) beaches generate the other half of the total visitation. Only 40.7% respondents indicated that they have a degree from a university and 34.4% have an associate degree. Homeowners constitute 68.9% of the sample, and renters the remainder. 
DATA ANALYSIS
A concern with hypothetical referendum tasks is the possibility of strategic or protest voting in the form of "Nay-saying" and "Yea-saying" (i.e., voting 'no' irrespective of policy attributes variation, and voting 'yes' no matter the policy attributes). Among psychologists and sociologists studying response acquiescence, yea-saying is defined as the tendency to agree with questions regardless of content. Visa Versa the tendency to disagree is distinct as Nay-saying (Blamey, Bennett, & Morrison, 1999; Couch & Keniston, 1960; Moum, 1988) . Traditional statistical analyses of DCEs do not handle these extreme preferences well. Recognising this limitation, the random utility choice model utilised for this study is based on an innovative use of a standard Latent Class (LC) model. To begin, the proposed model allows the sample to be separated between those who make trade-offs and those who don't; among those who don't make trade-offs, it makes a distinction between those unswervingly protesting against or in favour of the referenda. For those who make trade-offs, it is assumed that the individual may be decomposed into discrete segments that differ in their predisposition towards beach maintenance policy and their sensitivity to different attributes presenting the policy. Thus, in addition to handling trade-off heterogeneity among "traders", we allow one segment to represent the Yea-sayers and another segment to represent the nay-sayers. (1) Sociodemographic characteristics form the latent segment membership likelihood functions for an individual. (2) Through a latent segment classification mechanism, the membership likelihood functions determine the latent segment (i.e. yea-sayers, nay-sayers and traders) to which an individual belongs. (3) The decision-maker has preferences with respect to the policy which determine the yes/no vote. These preferences are determined by the individual's perceptions of the given attributes, his/her personal characteristics and the latent class to which he/she belongs. These preferences are conditional on, and specific to, the segment to which the person belongs.
This structural model is an adaptation of the general framework presented in McFadden (1986) and Swait (1994) . 
MODEL FORMULATION
2
The underlying theory of the LCM posits that individual behaviour depends on observable attributes 3 and on latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved by the analyst. We propose 4 to analyse this heterogeneity through a model of discrete parameter variation. Thus, it is assumed 5 that individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of S classes (whether known or not to that individual), 6 but which class contains any particular individual is unknown to the analyst. Having said that, by 7 definition, we expect from the yea-sayers -who always agree to pay a levy to maintain the beach 8 regardless of the costs and benefits -to be deterministic and have probability value equal to one for 9 the Yes alternative. For this reason, we allow the utility for paying a levy ( to be a very large positive 10 value (effectively, positive infinity) for this segment. Visa Versa, by fixing to a large negative value 11 (effectively, negative infinity) we force the response of individuals in this segment to be No with 12 probability one; conversely, the nay-saying segment has zero probability of voting Yes. The segment(s) 13 who make trade-offs between the given options are considered to have a finite (and to be estimated) 14 as specified in equation (1) 
where ir| is the systematic utility for the alternative in the r th scenario, conditional on belonging to 25 class s (=1,…,S) with a set of preference component βs and an individual's sociodemographic 26 characteristics Zi such that 27 We assume that given the class assignment, the Ri events are independent. This is possibly a strong 33 assumption, especially given the nature of the sampling design used in our application--a stated 34 choice experiment in which the individual answers in sequence, and in short order, repeated choice 35 scenarios. In fact, there might well be correlation in the unobserved parts of the random utilities. The 36 latent class does not readily extend to deal with this potential autocorrelation, so we have left this 37
If Yea-sayers
aspect for further research. Thus, for the given class assignment, the contribution of individual i to the 38 likelihood would be the joint probability of the sequence Pi=[ Pi1, Pi2,…, Pir]. This is 39
The class assignment is unknown. Let His denote the prior probability for class s for individual i. The 41 polytomous multinomial logit form is 42 
The Log likelihood for the sample is 50
Maximization of the log likelihood with respect to the S structural parameter vectors, βs and the S−1 52 latent class parameter vectors, θ s is a conventional problem in maximum likelihood estimation. 53 54
RESULTS
55
UNDERSTANDING PREFERENCES OF DIFFERENT SURVEY SEGMENTS
56
A latent class model was used to estimate individual policy preferences for beach maintenance. 57
Results have been weighted by age and gender to represent the NSW population. 58
The latent class choice model used to represent the probability that respondents are willing to pay a 59 levy identified four segments in the population. Segment one was "Nay-sayers", who were unwilling 60 to pay any levy at all, no matter the amount or beach type; the second segment was the "Yea-sayers", 61 who said yes to any amount of levy payment. Segments 3 and 4 constitute the trade-off segments that 62 displayed preference heterogeneity around paying a levy for different beach categories over a time 63
horizon. Based on the estimated results and to make it easier for the readers to follow the estimation 64 results, hereinafter we call Segment 3 the nay-leaning and segment 4 the yea-leaning groups.
65
Reasons for this naming will become more obvious after reading the following sections, which explain 66 and compare estimates of willingness to pay in response to different attributes (levies of different 67 amounts and for different durations) amongst the segments. Segment membership propensities are 68 also calculated and reported to allow policymakers to understand the relative distribution of the four 69 respondent segments within the broader population. On average, the model predicts that 5% of the 70 population belong to the yea-sayers segment, 25.5% belong to the yea-leaning segment, 33.9% belong 71 to the nay-leaning segment, and 35.6% belong to the Nay-sayer segment. 72 Further, to avoid collinearity of the linear and quadratic terms, orthogonal polynomial coding was used 88
(for more information refer to chapter 9 in Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000) . 89
Based on the estimations and results in Table 4 , respondents belonging to the nay-leaning segment 90 are more reticent about paying levies: they are willing to pay a levy only in a reduced and specific set 91 of circumstances, and, therefore, a range of different attributes appear important in their utility 92 function. In contrast, respondents belonging to the yea-leaning segment display a utility that is only 93 affected by the levy amount. This indicates that they are willing to pay some acceptable amount of 94 levy, regardless of their distance to the beach, the payment period, or beach length and width 95 deterioration. Surprisingly, beach length deterioration was only significant for Bay beaches and 96 respondents belonging to the nay-leaning group (Figure 14) , and width deterioration was not 97 significant for any beach category. This suggests that the respondents were willing to pay some levy 98 amount to maintain a beach in its current state, irrespective of the expected severity of erosion 99 impacts on sand volumes -even to avoid a 5% loss of sand (minimum attribute level, Table 2 ). 100 101 102 Table 5 represent state-wide averages, whereby the proportion of households in the state that 107 would be considered yea-sayers, yea-leaners, nay-leaners and nay-sayers (based on their 108 demographic characteristics) has been accounted for in the calculation of the average WTP per 109 household. In practice, when calculating WTP for a specific beach in a specific location, the relative 110 proportion of households belonging to each population segment would be calculated with reference 111 to local socio-demographic characteristics. This means that the overall WTP and preference for 112 different beach types may vary across different parts of the state. 113 114 
119
We also investigated WTP by exploring the proportion of households in each population segment that 120 was willing to pay a levy at different amounts and/or for different lengths of time. This provides 121 additional important information to policy-makers about the degree to which the introduction of a 122 levy for management that prevents beach loss would be considered acceptable amongst different 123 segments of the population. 124 Figure 9 indicates that the proportion of households that are willing to pay a levy is greatest for Bay 125 beaches, followed by Surf, Iconic, then Main beaches. This trend is the same for respondents in both 126 nay-leaning & yea-leaning (Figures 11 & 12) groups; however, the proportion of households that are 127 willing to pay the levy varies between the nay-leaning & yea-leaning segments. It is important to note 128 that the lower proportion of households that is willing to pay a levy for the "all respondent" scenario 129 (Figure 9 ) compared to nay-leaning & yea-leaning, is due to the presence of nay-sayers (which 130 constitute about one-third of respondents). This highlights the problem that our segmentation 131 approach and the structural equation model illustrated in Figure 7 is trying to address. 132 Nay-leaning and yea-leaning groups showed different responses to increasing levy amounts at 133 different beach types. Bay beaches were associated with the highest rate of levy payment, with a high 134 of ~95% of households from both segments being willing to pay a levy amount of $5. This reduced at 135 a fairly similar rate to a low of 40% of nay-leaning and 57% of yea-leaning households willing to pay 136 the maximum levy amount of $50. For Surf beaches, the yea-leaning group had a much higher 137 proportion of households that were willing to pay lower levy amounts (peak of 89% compared to 61% 138 WTP a levy of $5 for nay-leaners). This declined to 19% and 15% of households WTP a levy amount of 139 $125 for nay-leaning and yea-leaning groups respectively. The greatest difference between these two 140 groups was observed for WTP for Main and Iconic beaches. Nay-leaners had a relatively low 141 proportion of households willing to pay any levy amount, with 5% to 25% of households willing to pay 142 for management at Iconic beaches and 2%-15% of households willing to pay for management of Main 143 beaches. In contrast, yea-leaners had much higher levy acceptance rates, with 13% to 74% of 144 households being willing to pay a levy for Iconic beaches, and from 20% to 83% willing to pay a levy 145 for Main beaches. 146 In contrast, distance to the beach and the payment time horizon had a significant influence on WTP 196 for the nay-leaning segment. Distance to the beach had a significant effect for all four of the beach 197 categories investigated. As the distance to beach increases, the probability of nay-leaning households 198 being willing to pay the average levy for each beach category declined. The rate of decline was greatest 199
for Main and Bay beaches, and less for Surf and Iconic beaches (Figure 12 ). For the nay-leaning 200 segment, an increasing time horizon had a negative effect on WTP for iconic, surf and bay beaches 201 ( Figure 13 ). 202
Finally, for the nay-leaning segment, the beach length deterioration was only significant for Bay 203 beaches (Figure 14) , and width deterioration was not significant for any beach category. 204
Taken in tandem, the trends in WTP in response to the distance from beach and payment horizon for 205 the nay-leaning segment suggest that these respondents hold different values for different types of 206 beaches. Lower sensitivity to the payment horizon for Bay and Main beaches (and Surf beaches -207 although to a lesser degree) suggests that values for these beaches may include some portion of 208 bequest value. High sensitivity to the distance from the beach for Bay and Main beaches types 209
suggests nay-leaning respondents may also hold 'option value' for these two beach types (being more  210 willing to conserve beaches they are more likely to visit). These different non-market values and their 211 implications for policy and management are discussed further in Section 6. 212 
UNDERSTANDING THE SURVEY POPULATION
246
Results in the lower section in Table 4 show segment membership propensity. The estimation results 247 indicate that the probability of membership to different survey segments is not strongly related to 248 respondents' characteristics. The exception is for the nay-sayers group. Characteristics such as gender, 249 being a beach user and increasing age became significant in positioning a respondent to be more likely 250 in the nay-saying group. Males relative to females, non-beach users relative to beach-users and older 251 relative to younger individuals, all increase the probability of saying no to any kind of levy payments. 252
After weighting the sample to the NSW population, 35.6% of the population are classified as nay-253 sayers, and 5% as pure yea-sayers, implying that the remaining 59.3% would trade off policy attributes 254 with different marginal rates of substitution (Figure 15 ). This 59.3% cluster is constituted of 33.9% 255 nay-leaning and 25.5% yea-leaning segments. In Figure 16 we present the probability of belonging to 256 different segments of Male respondents only. As shown the probability of belonging to the Nay-sayers 257 group when all respondents are included (35.6%) increases to 39.3% for male only. Further, if the male 258
is not a beach-user ( Figure 16B ) this probability increases to 46.0% and if this non beach-user male 259 belongs to 75 and plus age category, the probability of belonging to nay-sayers increases to 55.1% 260 ( Figure 16C ). 261 be assessed and optimised in line with local community preferences for future coastline configuration. 295
One of our major findings is that there is no effect of degree of beach deterioration -characterised as 296 loss of width and/or length of sandy beaches of between 5% and 100% -on respondents' willingness 297 to pay for a management levy (although we note an exception for nay-leaners' preferences for Bay 298 beaches). This finding suggests that respondents who agreed to pay a management levy were 299 motivated to preserve sandy beaches in their current state irrespective of the severity of sand loss 300 likely to occur as a result of coastal erosion. Respondents were willing to pay a levy to avoid even small 301 losses (5% of the current sand volume). This is consistent with the economic theory that highlights 302 general unwillingness to accept the loss (survey respondents typically assign a relatively higher value 303 to an averted loss than to a potential gain of similar magnitude; condition. This can be considered a positive result in terms of sustainable financing perspective in that 307 WTP spans the breadth of the coastline and is not merely reactionary to intense coastal risk or 308 damage, but it presents difficulties in terms of strategic prioritisation. 309
However, other of our findings can assist with spatial prioritisation of coastal erosion management. 310
These include our finding that respondents were willing to pay different levy amounts for different 311 types of beaches (Iconic, Main, Bay and Surf). We also find differences in WTP amongst different 312 populations segments (yea-sayers, yea-leaners, nay-leaners, nay-sayers). To the extent that these 313 can be linked to socio-demographic characteristics (see Section 5.2), these can also be used to 314 discriminate the value and beach preferences of a specific community or local government area in 315 order to assist with spatial prioritisation. 316
We have used the time-and distance decay trends in WTP to infer the types of non-market values 317
held by different (nay-leaning, yea-leaning and yea-saying) respondent groups. We rely on the 318 "pragmatic approach to measuring non-use values" published by Marre et al. (2015) . Three survey 319 segments (nay-leaning, yea-leaning and yea-saying) reported some WTP for a levy with 50 years 320 payment horizon. Given that for ~80% of those surveyed (those aged 35 or above) a 50 years payment 321 horizon goes beyond their own life expectancy -currently 82.9 years for Australians (World Health 322
Organization 2016)-we consider that respondents from each of these groups held some component 323 of bequest value. We note there was no tendency towards increased WTP a levy for beaches close to 324 a respondent's home for yea-saying and yea-leaning groups -suggesting this group holds existence 325 value that is independent of the likelihood that they will visit a specific beach, either now or in the 326 future. In contrast, nay-sayers demonstrated increased WTP for beaches close to home, pointing to 327 some element of option value. An increased WTP for local beaches also has implications for scale at 328 which levy might be implemented. It suggests that a levy that is administered locally will increase 329 acceptability to a broader segment of the population (capturing ~35% of the population we identified 330 as nay-leaning). 331
The format of our survey makes it possible to estimate the aggregate willingness to pay for a proposed 332 levy amount and duration for the preservation of a specific beach. An example is provided in Figure  333 17. For demonstration purposes, willingness to pay has been broken down by beach users and non-334 beach users (a common approach in valuation studies and one that is sometimes of interest to 335 policymakers). WTP as presented in Figure 17 also takes into consideration whether an individual (user 336 or non-user) is a yea-sayer, yea-leaning, nay-leaning or nay-sayer. The example shows WTP arising 337 from a levy amount of $5 for a period of 10 years to maintain the current condition of Austinmer beach 338 in Wollongong LGA. This results in a total WTP value of $142,330 per annum, where $108,261 is 339 derived from the beach users and $34,069 from non-users. Furthermore, it shows that out of the 340 $108,261 for beach users that are yea-sayers, their WTP is $41,024, and the yea-leaning group are 341 WTP $22,149. Nay-leaning has a total WTP of $45,088 and finally, for the nay-sayers, there is no WTP 342 at any levy amount. The proportion of households belonging to each segment that is willing to pay the 343 specific management levy is also given. We emphasise that the difference in WTP between users and 344 non-users identified in Figure 17 emerges from differences in the relative proportion of survey 345 segments (yea-sayers, yea-learners, nay-leaners, nay-sayers), rather than from differences in the 346 underlying values per se. This highlights the value of our latent class segmentation approach and the 347 benefits for interpretation it can provide over traditional models that treat these groups as separate 348 and different entities. 349 As a final note of the nature of non-market values for sandy beaches presented in this study, we 365 highlight that it is not necessarily the case that nay-sayers hold a zero non-use value for sandy 366
beaches. An alternative explanation is that they may have lodges a 'protest vote' about the proposed 367 payment vehicle (annual levy) or about where responsibility for further investment in coastal 368 protection lies -they may think that it should already be covered in their taxes. there is WTP within the community to preserve sandy beaches in the face of future coastal erosion, 380 raising the possibility of realising better funding arrangements for the preservation of coastal assets. 381
Our findings contribute to the current literature by providing significant empirical findings that coastal 382 managers can benefit from in their decision making as well as investigating a new public funding 383 mechanism. Moreover, from a methodological perspective, this study is innovative in using the 384 standard latent class model in the treatment of strategic or protest voting in the form of "nay-saying" 385 as well as "yea-saying" at the estimation stage rather than through elimination by the researcher prior 386 to the estimation .  387   388  389  390   391   392   393   394  395  396  397  398  399   400 
